Introduction
Rubinstein (1982) delighted economists by establishing uniqueness of perfect equilibrium in an infinite horizon bargaining model. Once the surprise wore off, attention moved to another intriguing feature of the model: in the unique equilibrium, agreement is reached immediately. While this did not square well with some real-world phenomena (protracted haggling over prices, strikes in labor negotiations and so on), it was expected that introducing asymmetric information into the model would easily produce delay to agreement. If the purpose of holding out for a better deal is to signal the strength of one's bargaining position, then the existence of asymmetric information (without which there would be nothing to signal) might naturally be expected to go hand in hand with delay to agreement.
The asymmetric information bargaining literature did not unfold exactly as hoped. The early papers revealed a vast multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria, even for onesided asymmetric information (Rubinstein (1985) ) or for only two periods in the case of bilateral informational asymmetry (Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) ). More specific results relied on severely limited strategy spaces (Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) ), appeals to "reasonable" selections from the equilibrium correspondences (Sobel and Takahashi (1983) , Cramton (1984) , Chatterjee and Samuelson (1988) ) or axiomatic restrictions of equilibrium (Rubinstein (1985) and Gul and Sonnenschein (1988) ). The latter two papers study one-sided asymmetric information and produce solutions with a "Coasean" flavor:
1 the uninformed player, facing an opponent drawn from a distribution of payoff types, does as badly as she would if she instead faced, with certainty, the strongest possible opponent from that distribution. Moreover, there is virtually no delay to agreement. (Both these results apply to situations where offers can be made frequently.)
This paper investigates the effects of introducing behavioral perturbations 2 into a bargaining model with one-sided asymmetric information. Will this achieve equilibrium selection, as in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) , Abreu and Gul (2000) and Abreu and Pearce (2007) ? And if so, will the predictions agree with the axiomatic treatment of Rubinstein (1985) ? The model we perturb is the leading example of the class covered by Rubinstein (1985) . Player A is of known preferences, but she is unsure which of two discount rates player B uses to discount his payoff stream.
1 Coase (1971) conjectured that when a durable goods monopolist faces buyers with a distribution of valuations, most sales will occur almost immediately, at a price near the infimum of that valuation distribution. Coase assumed that the monopolist was free to adjust prices frequently. In the 1980's a series of papers verified the conjecture with increasing conclusiveness and generality. See especially Stokey (1981) , Bulow (1982) , Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985) and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986) , and for a critique of some of the axioms imposed, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) . 2 A trio of papers , Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) and ) opened the reputational literature by demonstrating the power that even small reputational perturbations could have in games with long or infinite horizons. Fudenberg and Levine (1989) show the success a patient long-run player can have against short-run opponents by choosing which of many reputational types to imitate. Much of the ensuing literature is surveyed authoritatively by Mailath and Samuelson (2006) .
We begin in Section 2 by considering stationary behavioral types, who never waver from the demands they make at the beginning of the game. This is the class of types used by Myerson (1991) and Abreu and Gul (2000) . We show that equilibrium is essentially unique: with high probability, play ends almost immediately, and the uninformed player's expected payoff is virtually what she would have received in a full information Rubinstein (1982) solution if her opponent were known to be the stronger (more patient) of the two possible rational types. This is in agreement with Rubinstein (1985) , and reinforces the message of Inderst (2005) , who showed that in a durable goods monopoly problem, endowing the monopolist with an ex ante reputation for (possibly) being a behavioral type, does not overturn Coase's predictions unless that ex ante probability is substantial. See Kim (2009) for extensions of that work. Abreu and Pearce (2007) established that the stationary behavioral types are a "sufficiently rich" class 3 of perturbations to consider in stationary bargaining games (or more generally, in repeated games with contracts). There are reasons to doubt that this is true with asymmetric information. Cramton (1984) emphasizes the importance for an informed player of delaying his first offer, to signal strength (his Introduction opens with a dramatic illustration from military history). Accordingly, in Section 3 we expand the set of behavioral types for the informed player so that player B can use the tactic of delaying making an offer, without losing his reputation for being behavioral. This innovation turns out to be crucial. While equilibrium is still unique, it takes an entirely different form from Section 2. A hybrid equilibrium results from the patient player B trying to use delay to separate himself from the impatient version of B. For many parameter values, the uninformed player A does better than in the Coasean solution, and there is considerable expected delay to agreement.
Notably, the payoffs of the unique solution of Section 3 are continuous in the prior probability (call it α 2 ) that the informed player B is the more patient of his two rational types. Contrast this to Rubinstein (1985) , where players' payoffs are discontinuous at α 2 = 0 (the uninformed player's payoff is given by the full information Rubinstein solution with impatient player B when α 2 = 0, whereas it is given roughly by the full information solution with the patient player B whenever α 2 is positive). The same troubling discontinuity is familiar from the durable goods monopoly problem, where only the lower support of the price distribution matters to the seller.
Atemporal Types
Two players bargain over the division of a surplus. Player A opens the game by demanding a share a ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus. Having observed this demand, B can accept it or make a counteroffer b ∈ (1 − a, 1] (interpreted as the share of the surplus that B demands). It is convenient to adopt a continuous/discrete time model in which a player can change his demand at any time in {1, 2, 3, . . . }, but can concede to an outstanding demand at any t ∈ [0, ∞). This modeling device, introduce by Abreu and Pearce (2007) , allows us to do war of attrition calculations in continuous time, while avoiding the usual pathologies that arise in continuous time games. If at any time t ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . } the players make (simultaneously) compatible demands (a, b) (that is, a + b ≤ 1), one of the two divisions of surplus (a, 1 − a) or (1 − b, b) is implemented with probability 1/2 each, and the game ends.
The players can be "rational" or "behavioral" independently. Rational player A's discount rate is r A > 0 and rational player B's discount rate is either r . Each player's type (whether he is rational or behavioral and the value of his discount rate) is private information. Rational players are assumed to maximize the expected discounted value of their shares. If agreement is never reached, they both receive 0 payoffs. Behavioral types for A and B are represented by two finite sets A, B ⊂ (0, 1). A behavioral player A of type a ∈ A makes the initial demand a, never changes her initial demand, and accepts (immediately) a counteroffer b if and only if 1 − b ≥ a. Behavioral types B are similarly defined. Player i ∈ {A, B} is behavioral with probability z i and for each a ∈ A and b ∈ B,
We will denote this incomplete information game by Γ(r, α, z A , z B ), where r = (r A , r Hereafter, we find it convenient to call A the rational player A and B k the rational player B with discount rate r B k , k = 1, 2. We will require that A's initial demand belongs to A, and similarly that B k 's initial demand belongs to B. There is no restriction on either player's subsequent demands. 4 In equilibrium, A chooses an initial posture a ∈ A with probability φ A (a), and after observing a, B k chooses an initial posture b ∈ B with probability φ
are the posterior probabilities that player A is behavioral, and that player B is behavioral or B k , respectively. For simplicity, we will often omit the arguments (a, b) and simply write, for example,
4 This is without loss of generality. The choice ofā ∈ A for A weakly dominates any a / ∈ A, and when A demands a ∈ A, a counteroffer b / ∈ B yields a unique equilibrium in which B k concedes to a right away with probability 1, k = 1, 2. This is another expression of Coasean dynamics (see Section 8.8 of Myerson (1991) , Proposition 4 of Abreu and Gul (2000) and Lemma 1 of Abreu and Pearce (2007)).
For any (a, b) ∈ A × B with a + b > 1, the subgame Γ(r,α 1 ,α 2 ,ẑ A ,ẑ B , a, b) is played as a war of attrition (WOA) and has a unique equilibrium, similar to the equilibrium obtained by Abreu and Gul (2000) . After adopting the initial postures (a, b), each rational player randomly chooses a time to accept the opponent's demand (if the opponent has not accepted already). A rational player has the option of changing his initial demand at any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. But doing so would reveal that he is rational and in the unique equilibrium of the continuation game he should concede to the opponent's demand immediately.
5 Let µ i = (1 −ẑ i ) × (probability that i concedes at time 0) be the (total) probability that i ∈ {A, B} concedes at time 0. Then µ A · µ B = 0 since when µ B > 0, for example, A strictly prefers to wait at time 0. If 0 < µ B ≤α 1 , then only B 1 concedes immediately with positive probability, but if µ B >α 1 , then B 1 concedes immediately with probability 1 and B 2 concedes immediately with positive probability. Thus, if the players do not concede immediately, the relevant posteriors becomê
} , 
(Again, we will often omit the arguments (a, b) for λ B and λ A k , k = 1, 2, when the relevant (a, b) are clear from context.) Ifα 1 (0) = 0 then τ 1 = 0, and ifα 2 = 0 then τ 2 = τ 1 . Ifα 1 (0) = 0 orα 2 (0) = 0, the WOA is exactly that studied by Abreu and Gul (2000) . Whenα 1 > 0, λ A 1 keeps B 1 indifferent between conceding and waiting, but at τ 1 A becomes convinced that she is not dealing with B 1 , and switches to the concession rate λ A 2 that keeps B 2 indifferent between conceding and waiting. The concession rate λ B keeps A indifferent in (0, τ 2 ]. The players' reputations (that is, the posteriors that they are behavioral) grow exponentially over time:
At time τ 2 both players' reputations reach 1 simultaneously. Given µ A and µ B , τ 1 and τ 2 are defined by
The argument is as in Footnote 4. This argument presumes that when a player reveals rationality, his opponent does not do so at the same time. It is easy to show that in equilibrium both players cannot reveal rationality with positive probability at the same time. See Lemma 5 for an explicit treatment in the (novel) context of the temporal model.
If at least one player is rational, the subgame ends in agreement randomly in the interval [0, τ 2 ] with probability 1; if both players are behavioral, the subgame never ends.
The next four lemmas analyze the game by backward induction. Lemma 1 summarizes the solution of the subgame we have been discussing, taking the offers made and the updated beliefs as parameters. The expression L in the lemma captures the relative "strengths" of the two players' positions: unless the situation is perfectly balanced, where L = 1, one of the players is "weak", and needs to concede with positive probability at time zero. Player A's position is weakened by any of the following changes: an increase in her demand or a decrease in B's demand, an increase in her rate of interest or a decrease in either r 
When L ≥ 1, µ A = 0 and
Remark: Note that whenα 2 = 0 orα 1 = 0, the WOA reduces to that studied by Abreu and Gul (2000) where there is only one type of rational player B. In this case,
Proof. Most of the results follow directly from the analysis in Abreu and Gul (2000) . Thus, here we only deduce the value of µ B when L > 1. When µ B ≥α 1 , B 1 concedes immediately with probability 1 (and B 2 concedes immediately with nonnegative probability). Thus, if B does not concede immediately, A concludes that she is dealing with B 2 or a behavioral type. Consequently, τ 1 = 0 and A concedes to b at a constant Poisson rate λ
These equations imply that
When µ B <α 1 , B 1 concedes immediately with probability less than 1, and τ 1 > 0. In this case,
Lemma 2 concerns the limiting properties of equilibrium after offers have been made, as the initial reputations approach zero (in any manner not violating an arbitrarily loose bound). The striking result here is that player B's strength or weakness is affected neither by the interest rate r B 1 of his more impatient rational type, nor by the probabilityα 1 of that type. Only r B 2 andα 2 contribute to his strength (along with the impatience of player A). This is explained by the fact that forẑ A andẑ B very small, almost 100% of the war of attrition will be spent in the second phase (see the paragraphs preceding Lemma 1 above), in which A faces the more patient type of B (if B is rational). To understand why, consider the following example. Fixα 1 , the probability that B is the impatient rational type, at .9; the residual probability is divided between the probability (bounded above by .1) that B is the patient rational type, andẑ B , the probability B is behavioral. Absent any concessions at time 0, it takes a fixed amount of time τ 1 (dependent onα 1 , which we will not change) to finish the first stage of the war of attrition (given the rate λ B at which B needs to concede to A, Bayes' Rule determines the time τ 1 at which nine tenths of the B population, that is, all the impatient ones, will have conceded). Now letẑ B approach zero. The length of the entire war of attrition grows without bound, but the first stage is not increasing in length. Even though the impatient type was more abundant than the patient type at time zero, A spends almost 100% of the war of attrition fighting the patient type, whenẑ B is negligible. For this reason, λ A 2 appears in the statement of Lemma 2, whereas λ A 1 does not.
For any R > 1 andz > 0, define the cone and truncated cone
Proof. See Appendix.
For each a ∈ (0, 1) and k = 1, 2, let
is the "balanced counter-demand" that equalizes the Poisson rates of concessions when A only faces B k (and behavioral types):
When the demand a is too modest, any counter-demand
For simplicity, 6 we assume that the argmin is a singleton. Observe that when ⌊b *
for all ∆ ≤ ∆ and a ∈ A. We will assume throughout that the grid of types B is fine enough that ⌊b *
Suppose that the reputational perturbations z A and z B are very slight. Once A has made an equilibrium demand a ∈ A, with high probability player B responds by demanding the highest amount b ∈ B such that b is less greedy than the balanced demand b * 2 (a). Any demand higher than this, if offered with noticeable probability in equilibrium, would leave B in a weak position, from which he would need to concede with probability near 1. Lemma 3 establishes the payoff consequences for each player. 
Proof.
Step 1: To simplify notation, letb 2 = ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋. For the first part, assume by way of contradiction that there exist a sequence {z
Without loss of generality, we can also assume that
Clearly A is guaranteed a payoff of at least 1 − b in this subgame (since A can always concede to b). Therefore, A's payoff is at least 1 −b 2 whenever b ≤b 2 . Suppose now that b ∈ B is such that b >b 2 and φ
Bℓ (a, b) = 1 and A's total expected payoff in the subgame after the demands (a, b) are made is bounded below by ( 
(b|a) = 0 for k = 1, 2, then A's expected payoff is only bounded below by 0, but the probability of reaching the subgame with offers (a, b) is z Bℓ π B (b). Thus, A's total expected payoff after making the demand a is bounded below by 1 −b 2 − ϵ for all ℓ sufficiently large, a contradiction.
Step 2: For the second part, assume again by contradiction that there exist a sequence {z 
Step 3: Consider any b ∈ B with b <b 2 and suppose that φ
Step 2, we may also conclude that v
A∞ (a,b 2 ) = 1, which yields a contradiction as before. Hence φ
which implies that µ A∞ (a,b 2 ) < 1. Let τ ℓ 1 be the time until which A concedes at rate λ
If B 2 mimicsb 2 , he obtains a payoff of
Step 4: Finally, consider any b ∈ B with b >b 2 , and suppose that φ
Step 3 we conclude that φ
A∞ (a,b 2 ) = 0. Now we can simply repeat the end of Step 3 (which merely uses µ A∞ (a,b 2 ) < 1) to conclude thatṽ
z), and for any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (φ
The demand a * is such that its balanced counter-demand proposes the same partition: b * 2 (a * ) = 1 − a * . Note that if the grids of types A and B are fine thenã * ≈ a * and ⌊b
Temporal Types
In the model of Section 2, there was no scope for a rational player B to signal his patience: delaying making a demand would reveal his rationality, giving A the decisive reputational advantage. Here, we remedy the situation in the simplest possible way, allowing for reputational types of the informed player that wait a variety of lengths of time before making a demand. It turns out that in equilibrium, B can now signal that he is either behavioral, or the patient rational type. This can have dramatic implications for the payoffs achieved by the two players, showing that in this asymmetric information environment, simple atemporal types are not canonical in the sense of Footnote 3 (whereas they are in the symmetric information settings of Abreu and Pearce (2007)).
The temporal model differs from the atemporal model in that player B is now allowed to make his initial counteroffer with delay. Once player A makes her initial demand a, player B can accept it or wait until some time t ∈ [0, ∞) to make a counter-demand
Similarly to the previous model, once the counter-demand b is made, the players can change their (counter)demands only at times {t + 1, t + 2, . . . }, but can concede to an outstanding demand at any time τ ∈ [t, ∞). Rational players A and B k , k = 1, 2, have discount rates r A and r We also assume that behavioral types for B are "reactive" in the sense that if player A puts herself in a vulnerable position by changing her initial demand before player B has made a counter-demand, then a behavioral type (b, t) becomes more aggressive and immediately demandsb (and only accepts a demand a ≤ 1 −b).
Let z i be the probability that player i ∈ {A, B} is behavioral, π A (a) be the conditional probability that A is type a ∈ A given that she is behavioral, and π B (b, t) be the conditional probability density that B is type (b, t) ∈ B × [0,T ] given that he is behavioral. We assume that π B (b, t) is continuous in t for each b ∈ B, and that there exists π > 0 such that
We denote this game by Γ(r, α, z).
As before, we assume that [min A] +b > 1 and conversely. Furthermore, we assume thatb e
so that the more patient player B 2 (and therefore B 1 as well) would prefer to accept the demandā immediately to waiting until afterT to make the counterdemandb, even ifb were then immediately accepted by A. This is what we meant earlier byT being sufficiently long.
As in the previous section and for the same reasons, we assume that the initial demands of rational players are compatible with them being behavioral. In equilibrium, A chooses a ∈ A with probability φ A (a). For each demand a ∈ A, player B k either chooses to accept a immediately or to mimic a behavioral type (b, t) ∈ B × [0,T ] with probability density φ B k (b, t|a), k = 1, 2. Consequently, after the demand a ∈ A is made, A is behavioral with posterior probabilityẑ
and after the counter-
The analysis in the preceding Section leads one to suspect, correctly, that each side will eventually imitate a behavioral type, and a war of attrition (or an immediate probabilistic concession) ensues. Lemma 5 establishes the payoff consequences of being the first to reveal rationality. Lemma 4 points out that before player B has spoken, A is in a particularly delicate situation: if she reveals rationality, she expects B to act like the most aggressive behavioral type (because he is in a winning position no matter what types he imitates). The only exception to this expectation is if matters are even worse for A, because the equilibrium expectation if B responds to As revealing rationality by revealing rationality himself, gives A less than 1 −b (that is, the equilibrium expectation is a particularly adverse selection for A from the set of equilibria of the full information subgame.
7 ) Consider a particular equilibrium of the game, and the subgame after A has made some demand a ∈ A. In the subgame, there are expected discounted equilibrium payoffs v 1 and v 2 for the impatient and patient rational types of B, respectively, discounted to time zero. Because B 2 could adopt B 1 's equilibrium strategy if he wanted to, v 2 ≥ v 1 . If B k waits until some positive time t to make a demand b ∈ B in response to a, he must expect, if (b, t) is in the support of his equilibrium strategy in this subgame, to receive a payoff of v k e r B k t (discounted to t) by doing so. Figure 1 shows the "indifference curves" for the respective types of player B, and some particular demand b ∈ B they might consider making. Note that if neither rational type of B ever demands b at time t, then if A observes (b, t), she concludes that she faces a behavioral type and concedes immediately. In this situation, the payoff B k would receive if he deviated to making the demand (b, t), would be
Lemma 4. If player A (who chooses
(because if he is not conceded to, he waits an instant and concedes himself). Figure 1 also shows b z .
Figure 1
In Figure 1 , t * labels the time at which B 1 's indifference curve cuts b z , and t 2 the time at which the two indifference curves intersect. (Eventually we shall introduce a time t 1 < t 2 .) Consider times such as t ′ after t * but before B 2 's indifference curve cuts b z . B 1 will never demand b at time t ′ (even immediate acceptance by rational A would be insufficient to give him his equilibrium payoff). But (b, t ′ ) must be in the support of B 2 's equilibrium strategy: if it were not, deviating to it would yield B 2 a payoff of b z since it would be taken by A as evidence that B was behavioral.
We see that to the right of t * , the equilibrium must provide a payoff ramp that keeps B 2 on his level set. How is this accomplished? When B 2 asks for b at t ′ , there may be a concession by one side, followed by a WOA constructed so that each side is indifferent about conceding at any time. If B 2 's payoff is ramping up to the right of t * , it must be that A is conceding to B with increasing probability as B waits longer before speaking. Given the single-crossing nature of the level sets, a natural question is: Is there a fully separating equilibrium in the subgame, in which to the left of t 2 , instantaneous concession probabilities by A rise at the rate that keeps type B 1 indifferent, and to the right, at the rate that keeps type B 2 indifferent? Unfortunately, things are not that simple. B 2 would have a profitable deviation: ask for b at t ′′ slightly to the left of t 2 , and get not only the concession payoff that B 1 would receive there, but also the advantage of playing a WOA in which A's concession rate is calculated to keep the less patient B 1 indifferent (B 2 therefore receives surplus by playing this WOA, and this is a bonus to B 2 beyond the payoff that B 1 gets). Here we say that B 2 is "sneaking in" and playing the WOA (against an unsuspecting player A). We remark that B 1 has no incentive to sneak in to the right of t 2 : the slow WOA that A fights with B 2 does not interest him.
Notice that (b, t ′′ ) must be in the equilibrium support of both types. (If it were in the support of B 2 only, then B 2 would get no bonus from the WOA, and his entire payoff would come from the concession A gives him, which type B 1 could collect just as well as B 2 ; then B 1 and B 2 would have the same payoffs at t ′′ , a contradiction. We have already seen why it cannot be in the support of B 1 only.) If A, upon hearing the demand b at t ′′ , thinks it much more likely to have been said by B 1 than type B 2 , then in the event that a WOA ensues (rather than a concession by A), it will have a long initial phase in which A concedes at a rate that would keep B 1 indifferent; this is a major bonus for B 2 , and leaves him above his equilibrium indifference curve. On the other hand, if A thinks (b, t ′′ ) is sufficiently more likely to have been said by B 2 , the WOA will have a very brief first stage, which gives B 2 such a small bonus that his expected payoff is below his equilibrium indifference curve. We show in the Densities section of the Appendix that there exist unique densities for B 1 and B 2 such that each type's payoff lies on the respective indifference curve.
Return for a moment to the fiction that player A believes, upon hearing the demand b any time before t * , that there is no chance it was made by B 2 . We can plot the curve showing the expected utility B 2 would get if he were to sneak in under this circumstance; we call this the sneaking-in curve. Denote the sneaking-in value at t by v 2 (t). (We do not make explicit the dependence of the sneaking in function on b; the relevant b will be clear from context.) Lemma 6 establishes that it is steeper than B 2 's equilibrium indifference curve; Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the two possible cases (in case 1, the sneaking-in curve intersects B 2 's indifference curve to the right of the vertical axis, at the time we shall call t 1 ; in case 2, the sneaking-in curve cuts the vertical axis above v 2 , in which case we say t 1 = 0).
The analysis thus far has focused on the "horizontal" aspects of behavior in (t, b) space, that is, for a given demand b, at what times will each type of player B be active? Much more detailed distributional analysis will follow. But we turn at the moment to the complementary "vertical" question: which demands b will be used by B 1 and B 2 , respectively? As z approaches 0, strong results emerge here.
Recall that in the previous Section with atemporal types, both B 1 and B 2 put almost all their weight (asymptotically) on ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋, which would be "slightly generous" in response to a in a game where there was no impatient type (that is, α 1 = 0). "Slightly generous" means "the least generous response that is more generous than balanced". This remains true for B 2 in the temporal setting. But even asymptotically, B 1 may put substantial weight on both ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋ and ⌊b * 1 (a)⌋. The latter occurs only very near t = 0. All of this is established in Lemma 8. Lemma 7 prepares the ground by proving that if b ≤ ⌊b * k (a)⌋, and if B k has positive density on b over some interval and B j , j ̸ = k, does not, then that interval has to be very short. The idea is that if B k is making a more-reasonable-thanbalanced demand, and if he were getting a payoff ramp over a long interval, A's conditional concession probability to him could not be close to 1 for most of that interval. If B k is being generous, why isn't he getting conceded to almost for sure? It can only be because he is present there with extremely high density. But that can't occur over more than a brief interval (vanishing with z) or else the density would integrate to more than 1. 
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3, suppose by way of contradiction that the Lemma is false. Then there exists a sequence {z
The argument for k = 2 is virtually identical to Lemma 2 (ii). We present instead the very similar argument for k = 1. Now,ẑ
, and 
and define ϵ 3 = min {ϵ 1 , ϵ 2 }. Applying Lemma 7 to the interval s 0 = 0 and ϵ 3 yields an upper boundz 1 . Choosingz = min{z 0 ,z 1 } gives us our desired conclusion. □
Corollary. Under the conditions of the previous lemma, for any
a ∈ A, ifb 2 ≡ ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋ > 1 − a then ∫T 0 φ B 2 (b 2 , t|a, z)dt ≥ 1 −T |B|ϵ.
Corollary. Under the conditions of the previous lemma, for any a ∈
The fact that almost all of B 2 's weight is devoted to ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋, and that any of B 1 's that is not devoted to ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋ almost always goes on ⌊b * 1 (a)⌋ near the origin, suggests that we can work with a reduced game where both players have severely restricted strategy spaces, in the vertical dimension. We define and study that game now. We will show that as z approaches 0, equilibria in the reduced game and the true game are essentially unique, and coincide.
The Reduced Game.
Denote byΓ(r, α, z) the "reduced game" in which after A makes an initial demand a ∈ A, she cannot move until B makes a demand, and the set of B's behavioral types (depends on the choice a and) is {(⌊b * 2 (a)⌋, t) | t ∈ [0,T ]}. As part of the specification of the reduced game, if ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋ = 1 − a, then the game ends with B accepting the demand a immediately. When ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋ > 1 − a, the prior probability of type (⌊b *
Finally, if B counterdemandsb 1 ≡ ⌊b * 1 (a)⌋ at time 0, this demand is accepted with probability 1 immediately by A.
We proceed to analyzeΓ(r, α, z). The first step is to analyze the subgameΓ(r, z, a) which arises after A chooses some a ∈ A with probability φ A (a) > 0 (in equilibrium). By definition, when ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋ = 1 − a, we have immediate agreement. Hereafter we assume ⌊b *
Fix an equilibrium of this subgame and suppose B k 's payoff in the subgame is v k . As B k is limited in the reduced game (for t > 0) to the counterdemandb 2 = ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋, he only chooses the time at which he makes the counterdemand. Accordingly, we will simply write φ 
t). Proof of Fact 3: Consider t such that in equilibrium φ
Then, in the WOA following B's counteroffer at t, A will concede at t with probability µ 1 (t) as defined above, and thereafter at a rate of concession λ 
Recall thatẑ Proof. If B 1 counteroffersb 2 at any t > t * , then his payoff (discounted to 0) is less than b z e −r 1 t < v 1 . Hence φ 1 (t) = 0 for all t > t * . For the same reason, φ 2 (t) = 0 for all t > t 3 Let t < t 2 , so v 1 e r 1 t < v 2 e r 2 t ≤ b z It follows that either φ 1 (t) > 0 or φ 2 (t) > 0. Assume that φ 1 (t) = 0 and φ 2 (t) > 0. After making the counterofferb 2 at time t, B 2 can get his expected value v 2 e r 2 t in the ensuing WOA by waiting to see if A concedes tob 2 right away, and conceding to a immediately if A does not. But B 1 can obtain the same expected payoff by mimicking B 2 : counter-offeringb 2 at time t and following the same strategy after that. This is a contradiction. Hence, φ 1 (t) > 0 for all t ∈ (0, t 2 ). Finally suppose that t ∈ (t 2 , t 3 ). Again, either φ 1 (t) > 0 or φ 2 (t) > 0. Assume now that φ 1 (t) > 0. B 1 can get his expected value v 1 e r 1 t in the ensuing WOA by waiting until some time t + τ > t to concede if A does not concede first. But, if B 2 mimicks B 1 , he expects a strictly higher payoff as r 1 > r 2 , which is a contradiction since by assumption v 1 e r 1 t > v 2 e r 2 t . Hence φ 1 (t) = 0 and φ 2 (t) > 0 for all t ∈ (t 2 , t 3 ). □ For a given z, suppose that A chooses a with some probability φ A (a|z) > 0, and letẑ A be defined as in (1 
The function θ introduced in Lemma 11 is key and is central to our characterization results. 
Lemma 12.
Assume a ∈ A and α 2 θ(a)/α 1 < 1. Then, there exists δ > 0 such that for all
Lemma 13. For any a ∈ A, R > 1 and ϵ > 0, there existsz > 0 such that if z ∈ K(R,z), and φ
The overall equilibrium involves the strategic choice of a by A and in this analysis it is convenient to make explicit the dependence of variables such asb 2 on a. As noted earlier, we focus on the case of a small z. Recall the conditions of Lemma 8. We will argue that when φ A (a|z) ≥ ϵ, then equilibrium in the subgame is "essentially" unique and consequently falls in one of the two cases described above. Furthermore, in case (i), 
2 (a)⌋ and A concedes to ⌊b * 2 (a)⌋ with probability close to 1.
Letâ ∈ A maximize v A (a) and suppose for simplicity thatâ is unique, then for small z, A mimicsâ with probability close to 1 and the analysis of the subgame following the choice ofâ is as outlined above. We state these results more formally below.
The payoff from efficient IC separation is
the difference between this payoff and v
A (a) is
This difference is small when α 1 is close to 1 and/or θ(a) is small. In Theorem 2 below we revert to the true game Γ(r, α, z). The main differences between Γ(r, α, z) andΓ(r, α, z) are that in Γ(r, α, z) many types (b, t) with b ̸ =b 2 will also be mimicked with positive density, but by Lemma 5 these densities will go to zero with z. Furthermore,b 1 will only be mimicked (if at all) in a small initial interval. In particular: 
Proof. (i) As usual, letb
Consequently v 
Existence
The proof of existence may be useful in other related environments; it uses a novel mix of constructive and non-constructive elements.
Let Σ be the unit simplex in R |A| . That is,
V is a compact and convex subset of R 2|A| . To prove existence, we construct an upper hemicontinuous correspondence Ψ : Σ × V → Σ × V such that each of its fixed points agrees with an equilibrium of Γ(r, α, z).
For each φ A ∈ Σ and a ∈ A, let the posteriorẑ A (a) be computed as in (1), and for (4)- (5) and (10)- (11) as follows:
Then, for k = 1, 2, define
Let Γ(r, α,ẑ A (a), z B , a) be the subgame where player A has demanded a ∈ A and player B believes that A is behavioral with probabilityẑ A (a). An equilibrium for Γ(r, α,ẑ
where
Theorem 3. For each z ∈ (0, 1) 2 , the game Γ(r, α, z) has an equilibrium.
Proof. We first show that v a ∈ V (a) is an equilibrium of Γ(r, α,ẑ A (a), z B ) if and only if v a is a fixed point of Ψ (φ A ,a) .
A
vector v a in the interior of V (a) is a fixed point of Ψ (φ A ,a) if and only if Φ
. The boundary of V (a) is made up of three line segments. We now argue that Ψ (φ A ,a) has no fixed point in the upper or lower boundary of V (a), and that a fixed point in the left boundary would correspond to an equilibrium where B 1 concedes immediately to a with nonnegative probability. The left boundary is defined by v a1 = 1 − a and 1 − a ≤ v a2 <b (we include here one of the endpoints that is at the intersection of the left boundary and the lower boundary, but not the other). A vector v a in the left boundary is a fixed point of Ψ (φ A ,a) if and only ifΦ
, and v a is an equilibrium. Now, ob- 0) , where w 1 ≥ 0, so P V (a) (w) lies in the lower boundary of V (a) and v a ̸ = P V (a) (w). Finally, assume v a is in the lower boundary of V (a). Then, for each
, where w 2 ≥ 0, so P V (a) (w) lies in the left boundary of V (a) and v a ̸ = P V (a) (w). This establishes our claim.
For a given (φ
We now argue that (φ A , v) is a fixed point of Ψ if and only if it corresponds to an equilibrium of Γ(r, α, z).
and accepts a immediately with probability
is an equilibrium for Γ(r, α, z). The converse is analogous. Finally, since Ψ is upper hemicontinuous and convex-valued, by Kakutani's fixed point theorem, Ψ has a fixed point. □ (b) > 0 also implies thatẑ B∞ = 0. Now,
(ii) As remarked above,ẑ B∞ > 0 implies that φ
Consequently, lim L ℓ = 0 and by Lemma 1, µ Aℓ → 1.
Proof of Lemma 6
Let µ 1 (t) and τ S 1 be defined by
That is, µ 1 (t) is the immediate probability of concession by A that delivers the appropriate continuation value for B 1 and τ S 1 is the length of the corresponding WOA between A and B 1 (alone). Note that when φ 1 (b, t|a) > 0, whether φ 2 (b, t|a) > 0 or φ 2 (b, t|a) = 0, µ 1 (t) is always uniquely defined by the first equation above, a fact we will use later. Let
As in
Step 3 of Lemma 3 We now establish (ii). Let
We first show that Ω > 0. Since
we obtain that
Using the expression for C we deduced above, one can check that λ
Densities.
Assume that A has demanded a ∈ A, and that in equilibrium φ A (a) > 0, so the posteriorẑ A that A is behavioral is given by (1) . 9 By (2)- (3), (ẑ B (t),α 1 (t),α 2 (t)) are functions of (φ 
11 We now solve for (φ
) in each one of the separating and pooling intervals. Consider the WOA after the counteroffer (b, t) with t > 0. Let µ k (t) be such that
is the required probability of immediate concession by A to deliver B 1 his corresponding expected payoff. Similarly, when φ B 1 (t) = 0 and φ
is the required probability of immediate concession by A to deliver B 2 his corresponding expected payoff. When φ
It is also useful to define the functionμ 
To simplify notation here, since we fix b and focus only on the time dimension, we we write
They are also functions of (a, b), but since these variables have been fixed, we omit them here.
2 (t) ≡ 0 and only equation (4) below is relevant.
Separating Interval for B 2 : Let t be such that φ B 1 (t) = 0 and φ B 2 (t) > 0. By a similar argument, we now obtain that
Pooling Interval: Let t be such that φ B 1 (t) > 0 and φ B 2 (t) > 0. Here again, µ 1 (t) must be the probability that A concedes immediately. By Lemma 1, there exist 0 < τ 1 < τ 2 such that
The WOA should also deliver B 2 his expected value v 2 e r B 2 t . An optimal strategy for B 2 is to concede at t + τ 1 if A has not conceded yet. Therefore, B 2 's expected value in the WOA is
Subtracting b from sides in the previous equation, we obtain
Let
Substituting the expressions for the corresponding posteriors in (6) we obtainμ
Solving for E from (7), we conclude that B 2 's expected value is attained when
Then (8) and (9) imply
which can be solved for D and U to get
] m 1 and (12)
It is clear that φ B k (t), k = 1, 2, (formulas (4)- (5) and (10)- (11) For completeness, let us also include here a simple expression for the sneaking-in value function that we developed in Lemma 6 above:
Linearization.
In this section we develop approximations for φ B k (t), k = 1, 2, and their integrals. As in the previous subsection, we maintain fixed a ∈ A and b ∈ B, where a + b > 1 and 
Similarly,
This is a nonlinear equation in s 1 . If we view W as an exogenous parameter, the solution s 1 of this equation increases with W . When we make W = 0, we obtain the approximatioñ
and
Though this does not establish a tight estimate for s 1 , it does establish that |s 1 
, then t 1 = 0 (by definition) and consequently we defines 1 = max {(λ
, we still have thats 1 = O(∆). We discusss 1 later in more detail, after we obtain an approximation for φ B 2 (t). Let
If ξ(x, y) = x n y m , then by Taylor approximation,
We use this approximation when x = −s,
where the corresponding functionsγ are defined as follows The functions θ 1 and θ 2 depend on a and b, and are independent of (v 1 , v 2 ). Furthermore, they also depend onẑ A but only through b z (note that X depends on b z ). Since b z cancels out when we take the ratio, θ(a, b) is indeed a function of (a, b) alone. (15)- (17)). Therefore, we can choose δ > 0 sufficiently small so that |s i | < ϵ for i = 1, 2, 3. Now, if v 2 ≤ v 2 (0), then t 1 = 0 (by definition) and t * = t * − t 1 . Hence, (22)- (23) (22)- (23), and (0, t 1 ) = ∅. When s 1 = −t * , the pooling region is "truncated" in the left at t = 0. 
Temporal Model.

Proof of Lemma 10
